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Abstract
GRW theory offers precise laws for the collapse of the wave function. These
collapses are characterized by two new constants, λ and σ. Recent work has put
experimental upper bounds on the collapse rate, λ. Lower bounds on λ have been
more controversial since GRW begins to take on a many-worlds character for small
values of λ. Here I examine GRW in this odd region of parameter space where
collapse events act as natural disasters that destroy branches of the wave function
along with their occupants. Our continued survival provides evidence that we don’t
live in a universe like that. I offer a quantitative analysis of how such evidence can
be used to assess versions of GRW with small collapse rates in an effort to move
towards more principled and experimentally-informed lower bounds for λ.
1 Introduction
One central point of disagreement in the foundations of quantum mechanics is whether
the collapse of the wave function is a genuine physical process. If collapse is to be taken
seriously, we should seek to determine physical laws that might govern this process.
Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber theory (GRW) offers possible precise laws which guarantee that
the wave function collapses during familiar quantum measurements. However, observers
and measurements have no special status in the theory; collapses happen whether or not
scientists are watching.
The laws of GRW include two new fundamental constants not present in textbook
discussions of quantum mechanics. One parameter, σ, characterizes the precision of the
collapse events and the other, λ, the rate at which collapses occur. If these parameters
are chosen properly, the theory appears to succeed in generating the correct probabilistic
predictions for experiments taken to be within the purview of non-relativistic quantum
mechanics. However, as more experiments are conducted we continue to shrink the
space of possible values for σ and λ. Potentially, the allowed region could shrink so
much it disappears and GRW could be ruled out. Alternatively, new experiments might
confirm GRW over its competitors. As of now, there seems to be a fair amount of
leeway as to what values we may assign to the parameters (figure 1). Focus on the
collapse rate λ. It is fairly well-understood how we can put experimental upper bounds
on the collapse rate. If collapse events were too frequent, interference patterns would
be destroyed by particles collapsing mid-experiment, isolated systems would heat up,
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photons would be spontaneously emitted by free particles, and in other varied ways the
experimental predictions of the theory would be corrupted (these constraints have been
reviewed recently in Adler, 2007; Feldmann & Tumulka, 2012; Bassi et al. , 2013).
Figure 1: Parameter diagram of GRW theory
from Feldmann & Tumulka (2012). ERR is
the “empirically refuted region.” PUR is the
“philosophically unsatisfactory region.” The points
labeled “GRW” and “Adler” indicate the values
suggested in Ghirardi et al. (1986) and Adler (2007)
respectively. It should be noted that Adler’s proposal
was made in the context of CSL, not GRW.
In this article, I would like to explore how we might put experimental lower bounds
on the collapse rate λ. The trend in the literature has been to dismiss low values of λ for
non-empirical reasons or for reasons that presuppose the failure of the many-worlds
interpretation. When λ is very small GRW becomes an odd theory. Macroscopic
objects are not prevented from entering superpositions and the theory takes on a
many-worlds character (§3). Such versions of GRW have been rejected as philosophically
unsatisfactory. Surely they are. But, there has been disagreement about exactly where
the problems arise. Feldmann & Tumulka (2012) give the criterion, “We regard a
parameter choice (σ, λ) as philosophically satisfactory if and only if the PO [primitive
ontology] agrees on the macroscopic scale with what humans normally think macroscopic
reality is like.” Bassi et al. (2010) impose the requirement that “any superposition
reaching the eye must be reduced before it is transformed into a perception in the
brain.”, building on a suggestion in Aicardi et al. (1991). Adler (2007) and Gisin &
Percival (1993) argue that the formation of a microscopic latent image in a detector
counts as a measurement even before this image is amplified to macroscopic scale. They
believe that the collapse rate must be high enough that even these latent images do not
enter superpositions.
I will argue that very small values of λ are not just philosophically problematic, they
are empirically unacceptable even if the many-worlds interpretation is viable. In doing
so, I hope to begin shifting the burden from philosophical considerations to empirical
ones and to lay the foundation for a principled and experimentally informed approach
to determining lower bounds on λ. Although the paper will focus on GRW throughout,
many of the lessons could be applied mutatis mutandis to other collapse theories.
2 GRW Theory
In GRW theory, the evolution of the wave function is typically governed by the familiar
Schro¨dinger equation,
i~
d
dt
|Ψ(t)〉 = Ĥ |Ψ(t)〉 . (2.1)
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At some instants, the evolution of the wave function is discontinuous and not in accord
with the Schro¨dinger equation. The wave function collapses. According GRW, collapse
is a real physical process governed by well-defined laws and occurring frequently, not
just during measurements. Humans and other observers play no spooky role, they are
just particularly intelligent and perceptive collections of particles.
When a collapse occurs a randomly chosen particle has its position become extremely
well-localized. Collapses occur randomly at a rate of Nλ where N is the total number
of particles. That is, once a collapse occurs at T1 the probability that the next collapse,
at T2, will happen within time interval ∆t is given by
P (T2 − T1 < ∆t) = 1− e−Nλ∆t . (2.2)
The collapse rate λ is one of two new constants of the theory, originally suggested to
be on the order of 10−16s−1 (Ghirardi et al. , 1986). The collapse localizes particle I
(randomly chosen) around location X, where X is chosen randomly with probability
density
ρI(x) = lim
t↗T
〈Ψ(t)|ΛI(x) |Ψ(t)〉 . (2.3)
“limt↗T ” denotes the limit as t approaches the time of collapse, T , from below. Λi(x)
is the collapse operator defined by
Λi(x) =
1
(2piσ2)
3/2
e−
(x̂i−x)2
2σ2 , (2.4)
where x̂i is the position operator for particle i. The wave function after the collapse is
given by the pre-collapse wave function multiplied by a tightly peaked three-dimensional
Gaussian centered about X and normalized,
lim
t↘T
|Ψ(t)〉 = lim
t↗T
ΛI(X)
1/2 |Ψ(t)〉
〈Ψ(t)|ΛI(X) |Ψ(t)〉1/2
. (2.5)
The second new constant in GRW, σ, appears in (2.4) and characterizes the width of
the Gaussian that localizes the particle. It was originally proposed to be on the order
of 10−7m (Ghirardi et al. , 1986).1 In the remainder of the paper different values of λ
will be considered, but σ will be kept fixed at about 10−7m.
In the simplest version of GRW, GRW0, the wave function is all there is and its
evolution is determined by the Schro¨dinger equation (2.1) and the collapse process (2.2,
2.3, 2.5). In the limit where λ is taken to zero, collapse never occurs and GRW0 becomes
Everettian quantum mechanics (a.k.a. the many-worlds interpretation or S0). All there
is is the wave function and it always evolves in accordance with the Schro¨dinger equation.
Defenders of Everettian quantum mechanics tend to view GRW0 as the right way to
think about GRW theory since they think that our experiences of reality can emerge
from patterns in wave functions. For Everettians and others who prefer GRW0 to the
alternatives below, this paper can be read as a discussion of GRW0 in the strange regime
where it approaches Everettian quantum mechanics.
For some, GRW0 is unsatisfactory (e.g., Allori et al. , 2008, §4.3; Maudlin, 2010).
1It has been suggested that different particles might collapse at different rates depending on their
masses (Pearle & Squires, 1994). The analysis presented here could be applied to such a formulation.
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According to GRW0 there are no objects in familiar three-dimensional space, there is
only a wave function in an abstract space: a vector in Hilbert space, a complex-valued
function on configuration space, or some other exotic beast. In GRWm, the universe
contains a wave function which obeys the above dynamics, but that’s not all there is,
and, in some sense, that’s not the important stuff. In particular, it’s not the stuff we’re
made of. In addition to the wave function, there also exists a distribution of matter in
three-dimensional space specified by a density,
m(x, t) = 〈Ψ(t)| M̂(x) |Ψ(t)〉 . (2.6)
Here M̂(x) is the mass density operator defined by
M̂(x) =
N∑
i=1
mi δ
3(x̂i − x) . (2.7)
In the limit as λ goes to zero, there is no collapse and GRWm becomes Sm, Schro¨dinger
evolution with a mass density (discussed in Allori et al. , 2011). Sm is a many-worlds
theory much like Everettian quantum mechanics, but where the universe contains a
distribution of mass in three-dimensional space in addition to the unitarily evolving wave
function. Some think that GRW0 and S0 are unsatisfactory because such laws would
not give rise to creatures with conscious experiences like ours, perceiving an apparently
three-dimensional world. Readers who think GRW0 is unsatisfactory can understand
this paper as a discussion of GRWm in the awkward bit of parameter space where it
approaches Sm. In the following sections, I will not differentiate between GRW0 and
GRWm. Read GRW in whichever way you think makes it the stronger theory. Read
MWI as S0 if you’re reading GRW as GRW0, as Sm if you’re reading GRW as GRWm.
Perhaps neither S0 nor Sm really are many-worlds theories. Without collapse, one
might argue, it’s not that every outcome of a quantum experiment is observed by a
separate copy of the experimenter but that the single experimenter somehow experiences
all outcomes at once or otherwise ceases to have a normal mental state. If this is the
problem with these theories, GRW will become empirically inadequate as it approaches
S0 or Sm. However, determining when and how it becomes inadequate would require a
specific account of the abnormality that should be expected in the absence of collapse.
For the purposes of this article, I will assume that the theory GRW limits to as the
collapse rate is taken to zero really is a many-worlds theory.
There is a third version of GRW, GRWf. Here one supplements the wave function
with a primitive ontology of flashes. Taking λ to be small in this version of the theory
raises entirely different concerns from those faced by GRW0 and GRWm. The problem
for GRWf when λ is small is not that human lives are constantly ending, but that such
life may be absent altogether. Understanding the empirical adequacy of GRWf in this
region of parameter space would require a very different kind of analysis and for that
reason GRWf will not be discussed in the remainder of the article. A brief discussion of
GRWf in this regime can be found in Feldmann & Tumulka (2012, §4).
3 Branches and Stumps
GRW was originally formulated with the rate of collapse λ ≈ 10−16s−1. With this rate,
when a measurement occurs the wave function just starts to branch into a superposition
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of outcomes when, with very high probability, the wave function collapses to a single
definite outcome.2 This is how GRW solves the measurement problem: a single definite
outcome is guaranteed by the rapid collapse of the wave function and the fact that
probabilities for collapsing to different outcomes are (approximately) given by the Born
rule is a non-trivial consequence of the collapse process (2.2, 2.3, 2.5). If the rate of
collapse is taken to zero, then collapses never occur and GRW becomes MWI. In MWI,
every possible outcome of a quantum measurement actually occurs.
What if λ is chosen so that it is not quite zero, but is very small (λ  10−16s−1,
keeping σ ≈ 10−7m3)? In this regime collapses occur, but only very rarely. When a
collapse occurs, the results are catastrophic. After a spin measurement, the laboratory
enters into a superposition of a world in which the scientists record an up result and
another in which they record down. Later, if any of the particles that compose the
scientists or the measurement readout collapse, one of the worlds will be destroyed.
Imagine 15 minutes pass between the moment when the measurement occurred and the
time when collapse chooses a world to eliminate.4 In this time, the scientists in both
worlds can walk, think, and talk. After collapse, only one world remains. When a
collapse like this occurs, all of the inhabitants of the other world are instantaneously
and painlessly killed. Or, maybe the collapse doesn’t cause the other world to go out of
existence, but instead the tail of the Gaussian distorts the world and alters its evolution
so that it is inhospitable to human life.5 In this case, death is fairly quick but perhaps
not instantaneous. Either way, in this region of parameter space collapses are not helpful
shifts which prevent macroscopic superpositions from forming, they’re colossal natural
disasters.
The way the universe—the totality of quantum worlds—evolves in each of these
three regions of parameter space is depicted in figure 2. With λ at or near zero, worlds
branch every time a measurement occurs and each outcome happens on some branch.
For standard values of λ, branching is prevented by the collapse of the wave function
and each measurement has a definite outcome. For small values of λ branching occurs
before collapse is able to prevent it; collapse events occur after branching. Living in such
a universe is extremely dangerous as entire worlds are constantly being obliterated. If
you are lucky enough to find yourself living a long life, you should be shocked. Repeated
improbable occurrences often indicate failure of a theory. This is no exception. The data
you receive from your survival provides strong empirical evidence against the theory.
2There has been some debate over whether the destruction of other branches is successful; see the
literature on the problem of tails. Here I assume that the problem can be solved. If it cannot, GRW is
not a viable solution to the measurement problem. In particular, I will assume that if collapse chooses
one part of the state and massively shrinks the rest, it is not merely improbable to find oneself in a part
of the state that was not fortunate enough to be the center of the collapse, it is impossible. There is no
life in those other parts soon after collapse.
3This ensures that, in general, a single collapse will be sufficient to destroy branches in which the
measurement turned out differently.
4This would be typical if we choose λ to be on the order of 10−33s−1 and assume that there are
about 1030 fundamental particles brought into an entangled superposition by the experiment (using
(2.2)).
5See Wallace (2014); Vaidman (2014b, §8) for “solutions” to the tails problem along these lines (also
briefly discussed in Allori et al. (2011, §4)).
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Figure 2: Plot of GRW evolution for a sequence of three measurements for different
values of λ.
4 The Rarity of Longevity
To judge the empirical adequacy of a given theory, I will focus on the likelihood of the
evidence given the theory, P (E|T ). If, for some evidence E and theories T1 and T2,
P (E|T1) > P (E|T2), then the evidence E confirms T1 over T2. If one updates on E by
Bayesian conditionalization, then for any theory T , the credence assigned to T after
gaining the evidence can be expressed in terms of the prior probabilities as Ppost(T ) =
P (T |E).6 It follows from P (E|T1) being greater than P (E|T2) that, if one changes their
credences in response to E by Bayesian updating, the ratio of one’s credence in T1 to
their credence in T2 will rise,
Ppost(T1)
Ppost(T2) =
P (E|T1)
P (E|T2)
P (T1)
P (T2) >
P (T1)
P (T2) (4.1)
6Although I expect that this straightforward account of theory confirmation applies to the cases
under discussion, one might reasonably be concerned. The situations considered involve self-locating
uncertainty (see Sebens & Carroll, 2014; Vaidman, 2014a, §4.2) and Bayesian conditionalization must
be somehow modified to handle such cases (see Arntzenius, 2003). Some modifications will vindicate the
use of conditionalization here, others will not. To avoid controversy, I focus primarily on the probability
of the evidence given the theory and not the posterior probabilities that result from updating on the
evidence. I approach the problem from the familiar diachronic perspective, taking one’s previous beliefs
and evidence to together determine what one’s current beliefs should be. Alternatively the problem
could be approached synchronically, taking one’s evidence together with what Meacham (2010) calls an
“epistemic kernel” to determine what one’s current beliefs should be (there are several competing ways
of implementing this approach; see Manley, 2014).
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Theories that are empirically equivalent will assign the evidence equal probability and
the data that comes in will not discern between them.
The theories which will be compared are: versions of GRW with different
parameter values, e.g., GRWλ=10−16s−1 ; the many-worlds interpretation, MWI; and
some unspecified theory which gives the correct Born rule probabilities and guarantees
survival, QM.7 The constraint that QM gives the Born rule probabilities is the constraint
that: the probability of seeing the outcome corresponding to eigenvalue Oi of the
observable operator Ô is given by
P (Oi|QM) = | 〈Oi|Ψ〉 |2 . (4.2)
Throughout I’ll assume that the agent knows whatever is useful to know about the
universal wave function, Ψ, including | 〈Oi|Ψ〉 |2 for all i. This allows us to focus on the
confirmation of alternate dynamical theories without concerning ourselves with the way
agents learn about the universe’s wave function.
I will initially suppose that MWI is capable of recovering the Born rule probabilities.8
Convenient Conjecture In MWI, after a measurement of the observable Ô has been
made and before the outcome is observed, the probability one ought to assign to
seeing the outcome corresponding to eigenvalue Oi is given by P (Oi|MWI) =
| 〈Oi|Ψ〉 |2.
This is a highly controversial assumption, so let me clarify the spirit in which I am
introducing it. In order to put empirical lower bounds on λ we need to consider cases
where GRW becomes more and more like MWI. If we don’t have quantitative predictions
from MWI, it will not be possible to quantify the success of GRW in these bits of
parameter space. Later I’ll discuss how things change if the conjecture is false (§5).
In the notation used here, GRWλ=0 is MWI. So, when a measurement is made,
P (Oi|MWI) = P (Oi|GRWλ=0). Thus if we are assuming that the Convenient
Conjecture is true and thereby that MWI is empirically adequate, it follows that
GRWλ=0 is empirically adequate as well.
The question, then, is for what values of λ is GRW approximately empirically
equivalent to QM and for what values do the predictions of GRW and QM diverge?
If the predictions diverge significantly, GRW becomes empirically inadequate—the data
we actually have fits the predictions of QM.9 For the remainder of this section, take
the rate of collapse λ to be sufficiently small that whenever a measurement occurs we
can expect there to be copies of the experimenter who record each outcome. From the
Convenient Conjecture and the fact that the dynamics are the same in GRW and
MWI before collapse, it is reasonable to suppose that for these small values of λ the
7What wonderful theory succeeds in recovering the Born rule, as is demanded of the theory I’ve called
“QM”? This will be a matter of disagreement. Let QM stand in for your favorite theory, whichever
you think recovers the right probabilities, be it MWI, GRWλ=10−16s−1 , Bohmian mechanics, or
something else. GRWλ=10−16s−1 predicts deviations from the Born rule for certain yet-to-be-conducted
experiments involving, e.g., macroscopic superpositions (which, even if perfectly isolated from the
environment, would be predicted to be unstable). However, for the already-conducted experiments
typically taken to provide support for quantum mechanics the predictions should (approximately) match
those of the Born rule (modulo the concerns raised in §6).
8For an extended defense of this conjecture, see Wallace (2012). See also Carroll & Sebens (2014);
Sebens & Carroll (2014).
9It’s fine if the predictions for certain future experiments diverge (see footnote 7) since the data
might (for all we know) support GRW over alternative formulations of quantum mechanics.
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probability of seeing each result is given by
P (Oi|GRWλ) = | 〈Oi|Ψ〉 |2 . (4.3)
But, the observed experimental outcome is not the only data one has to update on.
The experimenter should also take into account the fact that she has survived for a
time ∆t beyond the moment when the measurement was performed. The probability
for surviving to ∆t can be calculated as
P (∆t|GRWλ&Oi) = 1− P (fatal collapse by ∆t|GRWλ&Oi)
= 1− P (death|collapse by ∆t&GRWλ&Oi)× P (collapse by ∆t|GRWλ&Oi) .
(4.4)
The probability of a collapse occurring by ∆t can be approximated using (2.2) along
with the simplifying assumption that there are NS particles whose collapse would cause
a jump to a single outcome: P (collapse by ∆t|GRWλ&Oi) = 1 − e−NSλ∆t.10 The
probability of dying in the event of such a collapse is just the probability that the collapse
is centered around some branch other than one’s own: 1−| 〈Oi|Ψ〉 |2.11,12 Inserting these
two expressions into (4.4) yields
P (∆t|GRWλ&Oi) = | 〈Oi|Ψ〉 |2 + e−NSλ∆t − | 〈Oi|Ψ〉 |2e−NSλ∆t . (4.5)
The probability of the total evidence can be assessed by combining (4.3) and (4.5),13
P (Oi&∆t|GRWλ) = P (∆t|GRWλ&Oi)× P (Oi|GRWλ)
=
(
| 〈Oi|Ψ〉 |2 + e−NSλ∆t − | 〈Oi|Ψ〉 |2e−NSλ∆t
)
| 〈Oi|Ψ〉 |2 . (4.6)
We can better understand this formula by considering a simple case. Imagine λ ≈
10−33s−1 and NS ≈ 1030 so that the experimenter can expect to have approximately 15
minutes between measurement and collapse (as in footnote 4). In this time, she can form
expectations about what will happen and look around. Suppose she sees an outcome,
10More realistically, NS would increase as a function of time.
11This is an optimistic estimate. In fact there will usually be many worlds corresponding to each
outcome and thus even when a collapse is centered on the right outcome Oi, one’s world might well be
destroyed.
12Here, to keep things simple, it is assumed that life on the branches not selected by collapse ends
immediately (setting aside the possibility of delayed death mentioned in the previous section and
footnote 5).
13Two clarifications: First, the proposition signified by “Oi&∆t” in (4.6) should be understood as
the indexical claim “I am alive ∆t after the experiment and in my world the result of the experiment
is Oi.” not the weaker claim that “There exists a copy of me who is alive ∆t after the experiment and
in a world where the result of the experiment was Oi.” Long after the experiment, the probability of
the second claim is given by | 〈Oi|Ψ〉 |2 since it is just the probability that the GRW collapse will select
outcome Oi. Thus the weaker claim might appear friendlier to GRW with small λ. Why focus on the
stronger claim? The weaker claim does not take into account one’s full (indexical) evidence and using
it to update probabilities in GRW and MWI leads to unacceptable results (see footnote 23).
Second, the probability of “Oi&∆t” (stronger version) is difficult (perhaps impossible) to assess
before the measurement since it is unclear whether one, all, or none of the post-branching copies are
identical to the original experimenter. Fortunately, we can focus on the probability assigned to “Oi&∆t”
immediately after branching. Since the experimenter doesn’t yet know which branch they are on or
whether they will survive, it makes sense to assign probabilities at this point. Further, these later
probabilities are what matter for theory confirmation as these are the probabilities assigned to the
evidence right before the evidence is acquired.
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OA, with low Born rule probability, | 〈OA|Ψ〉 |2 = 110 . She should be somewhat surprised
and also afraid. Now she knows that she only has a one in ten chance of survival. If she
makes it through the day, she should be surprised again. The probability assigned to
the total evidence (surviving and seeing that outcome) is 110 × 110 = 1100 , which follows
from (4.6) with ∆t 1NSλ .
Consider a variation of the previous case in which the experimenter does not observe
the outcome until long after the measurement. Assume for simplicity that there are just
two possible outcomes, OA and OB . In this case her survival should not be much of a
surprise; the probability is 82%. The probability of OA is 10% and the chance of survival
given OA is 10%. The probability of the other outcome, OB , is 90% and the chance of
survival given OB is 90%. Thus the total chance of survival is
1
10 × 110 + 910 × 910 = 82100 .
The probability she should assign to OA given that she survived can be calculated by
Bayes’ theorem as the probability of survival conditional on OA,
1
10 , times the probability
of OA,
1
10 , divided by the probability of survival,
82
100 . This yields
1
82 . The probability
assigned to her total evidence is the probability of surviving times the probability of
seeing OA upon surviving,
82
100 × 182 = 1100 (the same result as was obtained in the first
case).
In the first case—observation before collapse—the probability assigned to seeing
OA was correct but the subsequent probability of survival was in disagreement with
QM. In the second case—collapse before observation—the probability of survival was
in disagreement with QM and the subsequent probability of OA was incorrect. The
fact that the probability of survival was less than one in the second case shows that
GRWλ (with λ very small) could be disconfirmed by repeated experiments even if no
one bothers to look at the results of the experiments. In the second case, unlike the
first, OA is assigned a probability in disagreement with the Born rule. (The reason for
this disagreement is that outcomes which were already improbable get further penalized
for poorly predicting the agent’s survival.) Thus the problem for small values of λ
is not merely that the probability of survival is low but also that supposing one has
survived these dangerous collapse events leads to poor predictions about the outcomes
of measurements that have already been made. Note that by focusing on the probability
of the total evidence, (4.6), we need not worry about whether collapse happens before
or after observation of the outcome.
If λ is so small that no collapses are expected to occur within any reasonable
length of time ∆t and the Convenient Conjecture holds, the predictions of GRWλ
approximately match those of QM. However, as has been noted (Feldmann & Tumulka,
2012, §4), there would be little motivation for such a theory. It would be simpler to
just set λ to zero and remove the collapses all together, yielding MWI. As λ grows it
becomes more likely that a collapse will have occurred within ∆t and the disagreement
between GRWλ and QM gets worse. QM predicts that you will be alive whereas GRWλ
assigns a certain probability to your death. For fixed λ, the larger ∆t is the larger the
disagreement between QM and GRWλ; see (4.6). However, once λ is sufficiently large
the assumption that branching precedes collapse becomes invalid. In the next section
I’ll consider cases in which branching is prevented by collapse.
The fact that one’s own continued survival is used as evidence for assessing theories
is undeniably odd. Experimenters don’t typically keep track of the time elapsed since
the experiment was performed. But, epistemologists have contemplated cases much like
this where survival is relevant data. Consider the following much-discussed example
(Leslie, 1989; Swinburne, 1990):
9
Firing Squad Suppose that a dozen well-trained shooters are ordered to execute you
by firing 12 shots each. While blindfolded you hear 144 shots ring out but you
survive unscathed.
In such a scenario, your own survival provides evidence that the shooters intentionally
let you live over the alternative hypothesis that you got lucky because each of the 144
shots missed its intended target.
The situation here is similar to Firing Squad. The hypothesis that the squad
intentionally misses is like the hypothesis that QM is true and there are no cataclysmic
collapse events. The hypothesis that the shooters were attempting to kill you is like the
hypothesis that GRWλ is true for some troublesome small-but-not-too-small choice of λ
where worlds are constantly snuffed out quickly and without warning. However, there
is an important difference: In Firing Squad, the target will either survive or be killed.
In GRWλ with troublesome λ, there will be many versions of the experimenter that are
killed and always at least one that survives. A closer non-quantum analogy is:
Prison Poisoning On New Year’s Day you wake up in a nondescript prison cell, #27.
A coin was flipped. On New Year’s Eve, you were blindfolded and shipped either
to Alcatraz, if heads, or Arkham, if tails. Each prison contains 100 numbered cells
and you were randomly assigned to #27.14 While you slept in your cell the new
year began with a randomly chosen 99 of the 100 cells in Arkham being filled with
deadly poison gas. Those in Alcatraz were safe. You knew the plan all along.
In this case, you should initially think it equally likely that you ended up in either prison.
After surviving the night you should come to believe that you were probably shipped
to Alcatraz since being shipped to Arkham would have likely resulted in your death.
It was guaranteed that one of the prisoners in Arkham would survive, but it was not
likely to be the one in cell #27. Alcatraz is like MWI and Arkham is like GRW with
troublesome λ. The numbered cells represent 100 possible results of a measurement and
the gas plays the role of collapse. For an analogue of GRW with a normal collapse rate,
one could introduce the possibility of being sent to a third prison with a single cell,
randomly numbered and free of poison.15
Cases like Firing Squad and Prison Poisoning have a curious feature: in both
scenarios, one hypothesis cannot be confirmed by the subject. If the bullets and poison
kill instantly, no course of experience would support the hypothesis that the squad was
trying to kill you or that you were sent to Arkham. Similarly, if collapse kills instantly
there are no experiences one could have that would provide evidence for GRW with
troublesome λ over QM (if the Convenient Conjecture holds). In Firing Squad,
the problem with the hypothesis that the squad is trying to kill you is not that it predicts
odd experiences but that it predicts your experiences will end. In GRW with small λ
too the problem is not odd experiences. In fact, in a theory like GRWλ=10−33s−1 if
the outcomes of many repeated experiments are recorded one can expect16 with high
probability that at any given time the record will show a sequence of results that looks
14For the closest analogy, imagine that each cell of the prison is occupied by a copy of you that
resulted from a 1-to-100 fission midday on New Year’s Eve.
15In this case, the fission in footnote 14 should not be supposed.
16That is, looking at the probabilities derived from the collapse process this is what one should expect.
As discussed earlier in this section, if one performs experiments, survives for a long time, and doesn’t
look at the outcome, the probabilities that should be assigned to the different possible outcomes are
not the standard Born rule probabilities. Seeing a sequence that fits these expectations should shift
one’s credence towards GRW with small lambda—but, only after the theory has been significantly
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randomly generated with each outcome’s probability weighted by | 〈Oi|Ψ〉 |2.17 If a
branching has just occurred, there may be multiple distinct versions of the record but
each will show the same long-run frequencies for the various outcomes as the records
will only differ in the last few entries. At any time, a typical observer will remember,
and have records of, measurement results that fit the predictions of QM. This feature of
the theory might cause one to doubt whether we could have empirical evidence against
GRWλ=10−33s−1 , but it shouldn’t.
18 As in Prison Poisoning and Firing Squad, the fact
that one has survived is relevant evidence in determining which hypothesis to believe.
In contrast to GRW with small λ, MWI predicts that there will at any time be many
observers whose memories and records don’t fit the predictions of QM—every sequence
of quantum measurement results is observed by the inhabitants of some quantum world.
The theory then faces the challenge of explaining why we should not expect to be
one of these observers (the challenge of establishing the truth of the Convenient
Conjecture).
Those who are attracted to the idea of quantum immortality may object to the
conclusions reached in this section. Consider a dangerous branching event from the
perspective of the many-worlds interpretation (a “quantum suicide” scenario). Suppose
you will survive on one branch and die immediately, or quickly, on all others. It is
tempting to think you should expect survival with certainty. As Lewis (2004) put it,
“The experience of being dead should never be expected to any degree at all, because
there is no such experience.” If death is indeed immediate on all branches but one,
the thought has some plausibility. But if there is any delay it should be rejected. In
such a case, there is a short period of time when there are multiple copies of you, each
(effectively) causally isolated from the others and able to assign a credence to being the
one who will live.19 Only one will survive. Surely rationality does not compel you to be
maximally optimistic in such a scenario.20 The situation in GRW with a troublesome
collapse rate is just like the delayed-death version of the above quantum suicide scenario
and, as in that case, survival should not receive probability one. If the collapse rate is
raised so that the agent never splits into multiple copies, there is no danger of death
and survival can be expected with certainty.
disconfirmed by one’s survival. Thus unlike Firing Squad and Prison Poisoning, there is in fact a way
to get a piece of evidence that points towards the dangerous hypothesis. Still, one’s total course of
experience will never favor GRW with small λ over QM; as can be seen by noting that the expression
in parentheses in (4.6) is at most one.
17If the collapse rate is much smaller, there will be many records only some of which show sequences
deemed probable by the Born rule (as in MWI).
18Wallace (2014) in considering a similar situation seems to find this—“strictly speaking”—sufficient
empirical success as the theory does manage to “explain why the scientific community has so far observed
statistical results in accord with quantum mechanics (via the anthropic fact that worlds in which
violations were observed are now radioactive deserts [the fate he believes befalls worlds in the tails]).
And it explains why it is rational to act as if the predictions of quantum mechanics were true (because
in those worlds where they turn out false, were all doomed anyway).” Vaidman (2014b, §8) also seems
untroubled by the possibility of death in the tail branches.
19Do the copies need to last long enough to have thoughts to cause trouble? I think not. If you survive,
you can consider what credences you should have assigned during the short period after splitting when
you coexisted with the other copies.
20The situation here is like that of the prisoner in Arkham if the period between the splitting event
(see footnote 14) and the deaths were made much shorter.
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5 Averting Branching
If collapse occurs sufficiently soon after a measurement, branching can be averted. As
the other branches of the universe where the outcome was different are just beginning
to form the collapse event occurs, ensuring that the macroscopic readout gives a definite
result and the experimenter sees a single outcome. The simplest way to incorporate this
feature of the theory is by introducing a cutoff characterizing the amount of time that
passes before branching occurs if there is no collapse. If a collapse happens within τ ,
branching is averted and a single outcome occurs. If collapse does not occur until after
τ , then there is a branching of worlds before the collapse, as in the previous section.21
Let C<τ indicate that collapse occurs before the cutoff, C>τ indicate after. Including
both of these possibilities, the probability of the data given the theory can be expressed
as
P (Oi&∆t|GRWλ) =
¬︷ ︸︸ ︷
P (Oi&∆t|GRWλ&C>τ )×
­︷ ︸︸ ︷
P (C>τ |GRWλ)
+ P (Oi&∆t|GRWλ&C<τ )︸ ︷︷ ︸
®
×P (C<τ |GRWλ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
¯
. (5.1)
The first piece, ¬, is just as in (4.6) where it was assumed that branching preceded
collapse. The fourth piece, ¯, is the probability that a collapse happens by τ . This
follows directly from (2.2), ¯ = 1− e−NSλτ . The second piece is simply the probability
that a collapse does not occur, ­ = 1−¯. The third piece, ®, is the probability that a
given outcome resulted from the GRW collapse process in a case where branching does
not occur. Here we have GRW working as intended and the probability should be in
approximate agreement with the Born rule provided λ is not so large as to push us into
the empirically refuted region of parameter space (figure 1), ® ≈ | 〈Oi|Ψ〉 |2.22 Inserting
these expressions in (5.1) and rearranging gives,
P (Oi&∆t|GRWλ) = | 〈Oi|Ψ〉 |2 −
(
1− | 〈Oi|Ψ〉 |2
)(
1− e−NSλ∆t
)
| 〈Oi|Ψ〉 |2e−NSλτ ,
(5.2)
which limits to the Born rule probabilities as λ goes to zero or infinity. (5.2) is not valid
if λ is large enough that the probabilities in ® deviate significantly from those given
by the Born rule. It cannot be extended in a simple and general manner as the way
in which ® deviates from | 〈Oi|Ψ〉 |2 will be depend on the particular experiment under
consideration.
In this simplified story, the probability of surviving to ∆t and seeing a certain
outcome Oi depends dramatically and discontinuously on whether collapse happens
before or after branching. The expressions for ¬ and ® are quite different. A more
careful analysis would ideally give a smooth transition or justify a precise cutoff, but this
would require wading into the murky territory of collapses that occur during branching
and settling questions of personal identity there (in particular, when exactly personal
fission occurs and whether it can, in any relevant sense, partially occur). It might be
seen either as intriguing or disconcerting that we must answer questions of personal
21The cutoff τ is not a free parameter and not derived from the collapse process. It could be calculated
by determining when branching occurs in the absence of collapse (see §6).
22Here it is also assumed that we’re considering familiar experiments, not future ones that probe
smaller values of λ (see footnote 7).
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identity in the context of MWI to put precise lower bounds on λ in GRW.
To recap: If λ is so extremely small that you should not expect (relevant) collapses
to have occurred in your lifetime (figure 2.a), then GRWλ is empirically adequate if the
Convenient Conjecture holds. If λ is large enough that collapses must be considered
but small enough that branching typically precedes collapse (figure 2.c), then early death
is the norm and one’s continued survival provides strong evidence against the theory. If
λ is increased to around the initially proposed value of 10−16s−1 (figure 2.b), the theory
may again be empirically adequate as branching is prevented by collapse and the collapse
process ensures that the probabilities of various outcomes are given by the Born rule. If λ
is increased even further, so that λ > 10−8, the theory is again empirically inadequate as
collapses occur too frequently. Superpositions are destroyed mid-experiment and other
maladies ensue (see Feldmann & Tumulka, 2012; Bassi et al. , 2013).
What happens if the Convenient Conjecture is false and MWI gives different
probabilities from QM? Then, GRWλ=0 is empirically inadequate as GRWλ=0 is MWI.
This failure also rules out GRWλ for very small λ where collapses can be neglected.
For larger values of λ where collapse is rare but relevant, there are now two ways in
which the theory fails: the probabilities of the various outcomes are incorrect and there
is, in general, some probability that one would not have survived to ∆t.23 For still
larger values of λ that successfully avert branching, the theory again has a chance of
being empirically adequate since the probabilities of outcomes are now determined by
the collapse process and the MWI probabilities are irrelevant.
6 The Race: Decoherence vs. Collapse
For GRW to be tenable, there must be values of λ for which the theory is empirically
adequate. On the one hand, λ must be large enough that collapse practically never
occurs after the experimenter has branched into multiple copies. Otherwise, one’s
continued survival empirically refutes GRWλ, (5.2). On the other hand, λ must be small
enough that collapses do not spoil the predictions for experiments that have already been
performed. That is, λ must lie below the experimentally refuted region of figure 1. But,
are there any values in this range? To answer this, we need to determine whether
decoherence-induced branching tends to occur before or after collapse.24
We know that for values of λ near the originally suggested value, 10−16s−1, the
experiment readout and the experimenter are in a well-defined state corresponding to
a single outcome very soon after the measurement occurs. But, what is not clear is
which of two possibilities occurred immediately after the measurement (figure 3): (a)
the world briefly branched and then a collapse event destroyed some of the copies of the
experimenter, or (b) there was never a branching event because collapse prevented the
microscopic superposition from causing the experimenter to enter into a superposition.
A proper analysis is warranted, but beyond the scope of this paper. Here is
a very rough calculation of how quickly collapse would have to occur to prevent
23When ∆t is large, the probability of the total evidence given by (4.6) is | 〈Oi|Ψ〉 |4 because the
probability of seeing Oi is | 〈Oi|Ψ〉 |2 and the probability of subsequently surviving is also | 〈Oi|Ψ〉 |2.
This suggests a crafty maneuver to save GRW with small λ. What if the probability of each outcome
were one—after all, each outcome will be recorded by someone—so that the probability of total evidence
is | 〈Oi|Ψ〉 |2 as in QM? This proposal faces a fatal problem: practically every experiment would confirm
MWI over QM (see Greaves, 2007, §4).
24See Schlosshauer (2005, §IV.E); Bacciagaluppi (2012, §3.1.2) for discussion of decoherence in GRW.
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Figure 3: Two potential close-ups of figure 2.b.
decoherence-induced branching: Decoherence is fast. A slow estimate might be 10−23s
for 1 gram of matter at room temperature in a superposition of two locations separated
by one centimeter (Zurek, 2003). To ensure a 95% probability of collapse by 10−23s, λ
would have to be at least 3 s−1 (from (2.2), assuming the number of particles is on the
scale of moles, N = 1023). But, experiments restrict λ to being at most 10−8s−1 (figure
1). This calculation suggests trouble. There may not be a safe region of parameter
space.25
Let me highlight one particularly pernicious simplification in this rough calculation:
It is assumed that the bit of matter starts in a superposition. In actuality, it would
take time for the matter to enter a superposition and a collapse event could occur
in this interval, preventing the macroscopic superposition from forming. It would
(normally) take even longer for a large object like a human to enter a superposition of
spatially disjoint states (although this is certainly asking too much; a far less dramatic
superposition should be sufficient for the human to branch).
I’ll close by summarizing the key lessons of the analysis. First, to determine precise
experimental bounds on the parameters λ and σ in GRW, we must answer metaphysical
and epistemological questions about MWI: When/how does branching occur in the
absence of collapse (§5 & 6)? What probabilities should be assigned to different outcomes
in MWI (§4)? This provides additional motivation for that ongoing research program.
Second, even if the Convenient Conjecture holds and MWI is empirically adequate,
some of the philosophically unsatisfactory region of parameter space is also empirically
refuted (§3, 4, & 5). Surprisingly, it is not refuted by the outcomes we observe, but
by the fact that we live long enough to observe so many of them. Third, it is not
clear how to draw a principled border for the philosophically unsatisfactory region if our
dissatisfaction is purely “philosophical” (§1). But, with the realization that small values
of the collapse rate λ are empirically refuted, we now have a method to begin drawing
principled lower bounds on λ: determine whether the experimenter branches before or
after collapse (§5 & 6). Simple calculations suggest that the lower bound generated
25This concern is corroborated by the calculations in Tegmark (1993); Benatti et al. (1995).
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from empirical considerations will be stronger than the bound generated from a distaste
for long lasting macroscopic superpositions, perhaps strong enough to rule out GRW
entirely (§6). This merits further study.
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